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Most popular approaches for modeling electricity prices rely at present on microeconomics rationale. They aim to 
study the interaction between decisions of agents in the market, and usually represent the impact of uncertainty in 
such decisions in a simplified way. The usual methodology of microeconomics models is the study of the 
interaction between the profit-maximization problems faced by each of the firms. On the other hand, there is a 
growing literature that describes the power price dynamics from the financial standpoint, through the statement of a 
more or less complex stochastic process. However, this theoretical framework is based on the assumption of perfect 
competition, and therefore the stochastic process may not capture important features of price dynamics. In this 
paper, we suggest a mixed approach, in the sense that the price is thought of as the composition of a long-term 
component, where the strategic behavior is represented, and a short-term source of uncertainty that agents cannot 
take into account when deciding their strategies. The complex distributional implications of the oligopolistic 
behavior of market players are then given by the long-term-component dynamics, whereas the short-term 
component captures the uncertainty related to the operation of power systems. In addition, this modeling approach 
allows for a direct description of the long-term volatility of power markets, which is usually hard to estimate 
through statistical models.   
Key words: power markets; pricing models; market power; long-term/short-term decomposition 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main consequences of the liberalization process that has taken place in the electricity and gas 
industry during last decades, and ultimately one of its main motivations, is the fact that market players 
have become responsible for the risks associated with the economic activity. In this context, market 
agents face the need to participate in financial markets that allow them to manage the risks involved in 
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their activity. Not surprisingly, the liberalization process has promoted a considerable amount of trading 
activity, which is in part similar to any other financial market. However, several particular characteristics 
motivate the special attention paid to energy markets. On the one hand, the specific risks in the energy 
industry promote the existence of products that cannot be found in any other market. In fact, they are 
standard products such as forwards or options, but their highly physical nature makes them to have 
unique characteristics. Moreover, the underlying asset is different of most of the usually traded products. 
For example, despite the apparently homogeneity of electricity, power produced today is essentially a 
different product of the electricity produced tomorrow. In addition, energy price evolution is far from 
usual. Probably, the most visible feature is the exceptional volatility of energy prices. In fact, it is not rare 
that the volatility of crude or natural gas prices is one order of magnitude higher than the, for example, 
the interest rates.   
The need for pricing and hedging the particular risks of power markets has motivated an unprecedented 
amount of research concerned with the description of the better strategies when dealing with uncertain 
results in the future. In particular, modeling the electricity price by means of a certain stochastic process 
has recently attracted a considerable part of the effort in the power markets description. Financial theory 
provides the theoretical underpinning for this approach. That is, the market equilibrium implies the 
allocation of agents’ risk, and such risk bearing can be described by a stochastic process. If one further 
assumes that the market is liquid enough, so that any risk can be hedged away, then there is a unique 
stochastic process for the price dynamics that represents the risk preferences of market players, and 
consequently can be used to price any financial contract –see for instance Duffie (2001) for a detailed 
discussion–. This approach has drawbacks, however, since although it represents the uncertainty in detail, 
the representation of the agents’ decision-making process is based on disregarding the strategic behavior. 
When dealing with power markets, one should take into account an additional feature that causes their 
departure from usual financial markets: they are highly concentrated. Probably, this is the main 
motivation for the fact that an important part of the literature on power price modeling is based on the 
description of market agents’ behavior.  
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The usual methodology of such models is the study of non-cooperative games. It builds on the idea that 
the market can be modeled as a game where players try to maximize their own profit, and that the market 
price is part of the solution of the game. Under the perfect competition paradigm, when the number of 
competitors is high enough, there is no relationship between the firms’ profit-maximization problems, and 
the game is equivalent to the cost-minimization problem typical of regulated systems. However, most of 
power markets are not perfectly competitive. Consequently disregarding the oligopolistic behavior may 
not be adequate, and thus the need for game-theoretic models. One typical consequence of an 
oligopolistic quantity game is the existence of a strategy where market players withhold production to 
raise the price. This behavior cannot be captured by a cost-minimization program. On the negative side, 
this kind of model simplifies the impact of uncertainty in the market behavior, which usually complicates 
the task of recovering the price dynamics in a proper quantitative way. 
Most of the financial models proposed in the literature to deal with power prices belong to the family 
usually called reduced-form models. This modeling strategy consists of the selection of a parameterized 
family of stochastic processes, and the calibration of the values of the requisite parameters –either 
through estimation from historical prices or through calibration from actual market data-. They usually 
consider the seasonality as a deterministic function of time –see for instance Deng (1999), Lucia and 
Schwartz (2002), Escribano, Peña and Villaplana (2002), Geman and Roncoroni (2002)–. We interpret 
this modeling strategy as a decomposition of the price in a long-term factor, which represents the long-
term equilibrium level and short-term stochastic deviations from the equilibrium. The long-term/short-
term decomposition can be found, among others, in Pilipovic (1997). In addition, Schwartz and Smith 
(2000) interpret these factors as the combination of an equilibrium price and a short-term factor.  
This paper proposes a mixed approach, aimed to benefit from the combination of both families of models. 
The basic idea is the following: the price is the sum of two components, a long-term level of the price 
described by means of an oligopolistic equilibrium, and a second factor describing short-term, stochastic 
deviations from such long-term equilibrium. In addition, as we represent the equilibrium component by 
means of its fundamental drivers, the methodology allows us for extending the previous literature in 
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power prices by including the uncertainty of the equilibrium component. In particular, the long-term 
factor uncertainty will be considered through the uncertainty related to its fundamentals. Moreover, from 
the statistical viewpoint, this modeling strategy has the advantage of mitigating the difficulties caused by 
the usual lack of data of power markets, because the fundamental representation of the electricity price 
allows us to make use of the available data in other markets to describe electricity prices –e. g. natural gas 
market–. That is, the ability to exploit new sources of information is an important advantage of the model. 
Finally, the model proposed also allows for qualitative analysis of the properties of the distribution of 
power prices. In particular, the strategic behavior provides a new factor responsible for the skewness 
observed in power prices. In this regard, price spikes induces positive skewness in the price distribution –
see for instance Geman and Roncoroni (2002)–, and thus, according to Bessembinder and Lemon (2002), 
risk premium in power markets depends on the probability of a price spike. In addition, we will show that 
the exercise of market power may result in another source of asymmetry. Actually, we will study in 
section 8 the prices in the Spanish wholesale market, where the implementation of a price cap precludes 
the existence of price spikes, but power prices remain skewed. 
We begin in section 2 with the description the general description of the decomposition of power prices in 
two factors, an equilibrium component and stochastic perturbations around the equilibrium model. 
Section 3 develops the description of the oligopolistic competition effects on market prices, that is, the 
effects considered in the equilibrium factor. Section 4 is devoted to the equilibrium perturbation factor. 
Section 5 contains the concrete description of the power price model. Section 6 contains the analysis of 
the statistical properties of the model, while 7 discusses the calibration of the model parameters. Finally, 
section 8 develops an empirical study of the model applied to Spanish power prices, and section 9 states 
our conclusion. 
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2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Seasonality is one of the most typical characteristics of power prices, and consequently any realistic 
model must incorporate this characteristic. Probably, the most direct approach is modeling power prices 
as stochastic perturbations of explicitly defined seasonal averages. Pilipovic (1997), for instance, 
proposes a model based on this strategy, which consists of a mean-reverting stochastic process –for the 
log-prices– reverting to a long-term price that evolves stochastically. This model is in turn close to the 
model in Schwartz (1997), where the proposal is a model for commodity prices that includes the 
convenience yield. In addition, Pindyck (1999) studies a long time series of natural gas, coal and oil, 
concluding that energy prices exhibit mean-reversion to a stochastically fluctuating trend, according to 
the parameterization of Pilipovic (1997). Geman and Roncoroni (2002) and Deng (1999) also model the 
price behavior as a stochastic process representing the variations of the price around a deterministic 
seasonal trend, but in these models the stochastic process includes a jump component as well. 
However, the direct modeling of the price process is a difficult task in power markets. On the one hand, 
the complex evolution of prices suggests the use of high-dimensional models, and thus the need for the 
estimation of a large number of parameters. At the same time, power markets are still rather immature, so 
that the available price data is not always enough for the correct specification of the model. The seasonal-
plus-stochastic decomposition suggests an alternative way of describing power prices: one may interpret 
the seasonal component as a certain long-term factor, and consider stochastic movements reverting to it –
such an interpretation can be found in Schwartz and Smith (2000)-. From this viewpoint, it seems 
reasonable to make use of the information contained in the fundamental drivers of power prices to 
describe the long-term component. This is the rationale of a family of models that we call fundamental 
models. They build on the idea that the long-term component of prices may be described as a 
transformation of the underlying variables that determine the price formation –fuel prices, demand...–. 
The description of the long-term component through its fundamentals may be tackled from two different 
methodologies.  
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One the one hand, it is possible to calibrate the transformation function from historical data. This strategy 
has been discussed in a number of works, including Eydeland and Geman (1998), Pirrong and Jermakyan 
(1999) or Skantze and Illic (2001). These models make use of the idea that the parameters of the price 
process can be described as functions of the underlying factors, so that the historical data regarding the 
fundamental drivers can be used to calibrate such functions, expanding the available data set. However, 
they still face the need of extensive historical information to estimate the transformation.  
Alternatively, in order to avoid the use of scarce price data, one can use the structure of the market to 
derive the transformation function, or in other words, the transformation of the fundamental variables 
should reflect the price-formation process. Consequently, the function mapping the power-price drivers to 
actual prices is given by a description of the market-clearing mechanism, so it need not be estimated. In 
this paper, we propose a model that follows this strategy. When doing so, we will be close to the proposal 
in Eydeland and Wolyniec (2003). Their proposal builds on the classical merit order of regulated power 
systems, where the unit commitment is the result of a cost-minimization problem. In this context, the cost 
of the system may be visualized as a stepwise function representing the marginal cost of the plants in 
increasing order. The approach, however, faces a critical drawback. Since it is based on the solution of 
the cost-based dispatch, it disregards the strategic interaction between market players. One of the most 
commented consequences of the oligopolistic competition is that the merit order used to construct the 
model is unknown a priori, and therefore it cannot be used to specify the structure of the transformation. 
In addition, the calibration of such models cannot capture the dynamics introduced by the exercise of 
market power. We will study these issues in detail in section 3.  
The previous proposals suggest the link between financial models for power prices and the models based 
on the microeconomics literature. Actually, the process of power prices may be described as a static 
transformation of the processes of the fundamental drivers. However, it is important to highlight that this 
static transformation cannot be cost based, but it should be a model that takes into account the market 
behavior. From this standpoint, a reasonable candidate for such a transformation is a model representing 
the decision-making process of market players, which ultimately determines the price formation. 
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Therefore, we propose to describe the transformation function of the underlying drivers of power prices 
by means of the solution of a static non-cooperative game.  
Our reasoning has led us from financial models, based on the calibration of stochastic processes of the 
price, to a fundamental model aimed to describe the market price as a function of its drivers. This model 
is a static transformation of the underlying variables that ultimately determine the power prices. We have 
showed, in addition, that a cost-based approach is not suitable to describe the evolution of prices, since it 
disregards the effects of the oligopolistic competition. However, the static model cannot represent the 
dynamic dimension of the true game. In fact, power markets are a sequence of spot markets, and 
consequently the strategies of players are conditioned by the fact that the game is repeated. Our approach 
builds on the idea that the equilibrium of such a repeated game may be modeled as a stable long-term 
equilibrium, represented by the static game, and short-term deviations from the equilibrium path reverting 
to the long-term equilibrium. The rationale behind this approach is that when one firm deviates from the 
equilibrium strategy, the rest of the firms will punish the deviation in the next markets, creating the 
incentive for the first firm to recover the equilibrium strategy. Nevertheless, this kind of behavior results 
in extremely complex effects, which are in general rather difficult to define in advance. In this paper, we 
propose an alternative way of accounting for dynamic effects, based on an aggregated representation. 
Actually, the power price will be a combination of the static equilibrium and a stochastic process 
reverting to the equilibrium factor, which accounts for the short-term deviations from the static game 
strategies –in addition to short-term contigencies, such as network failures...–. 
Therefore, let tp  represent the price of electricity at time t . We propose to describe power prices by the 
following expression: 
 t t tp yπ= +  (2.1) 
We propose a decomposition of the price in an equilibrium component tπ  and stochastic perturbations of 
the equilibrium component ty . The next two sections discuss in depth these two components.  
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3. THE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR OF MARKET PLAYERS 
The aim of this section is to describe the strategic component of the price tπ . We propose to model the 
equilibrium factor as the solution of a non-cooperative game, where the players decide their output in 
order to maximize their profit. The solution of the game is the Nash equilibrium. Thus, the solution of the 
quantity game provides the strategic behavior of market players, represented by their production 
decisions. Formally, the game is defined by the profit-maximization problems of each firm, taking into 
account that their decisions effectively can modify the market price. In addition, the market operator 
clears the market, and provides the power price. First, we will study a stylized version of the profit-
maximization problem that every firm must solve. Then, let itg  be the total production of the firm i , at 
time t . In addition, the output decision is characterized by a maximum output 
i
g  and the generation cost 
( )it tc g .  
Therefore, each firm solves the following problem: 
 
( )max
. .
i
t
i i
t t t t
g t
ii i
t t
g c g
s t g g
π
µ
−
≤ ⊥
∑
 (3.1) 
where tπ  is the market clearing price at time t , and iitg g≤  represents the maximum output constraint. 
The optimality conditions of the firm i ’s problem are the following: 
• The optimality with respect to output decisions 
 
( )
0
i
ti it
t ti i
t t
c g
g i
g g
ππ µ∂∂+ − + = ∀∂ ∂  (3.2) 
• The maximum output constraint 
 
ii
tg g i≤ ∀  (3.3) 
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• The complementarity condition 
 ( ) 0ii it tg g iµ− = ∀  (3.4) 
To solve this set of equations, it is necessary to define the market price, and consequently, there is a need 
for a model of the market-clearing process. Thus, we model a market operator that receives the bids of  
market players and clears the market. The problem may be represented, assuming inelastic demand, by 
the equation 
 it t
i
g D=∑  (3.5) 
where tD  is the system demand at time t . Consequently, the solution of the game is provided by the 
optimality conditions (3.2)-(3.4) for each of the firms i  and the market-clearing condition (3.5). This is 
probably one of the most discussed problems in electricity markets –see for instance Scott and Read 
(1996), Metzler, Hobbs and Pang (2003), Yuan and Smeers (1999)–. It is worth to analyze the results 
implied by the equilibrium model in some detail, since they play a key role in the characteristics of the 
price process proposed in this paper. In particular, equation (3.2) represents the relationship between the 
firms’ decisions and the market price. The expression 
( )it i
ti
t
c g
g
µ∂− +∂  is the marginal cost of the firm i . If 
the output of the firm is below its limits, then the maximum output constraint is not active, and its 
Lagrange multiplier is equal to zero 0itµ = . Therefore, the production of the plant is at the margin. If the 
maximum output constraint is binding, the Lagrange multiplier is not equal to zero, and the firm is below 
the margin.  
Consider first that there is no opportunity to manipulate the price, or equivalently, the market is perfectly 
competitive. Then, 0ti
tg
π∂ =∂ and the equation becomes 
( )it i
t ti
t
c g
g
π µ∂= −∂ , the traditional “price is equal to 
marginal cost” result. The term iti gg
π∂
∂  shows the incentives for price manipulation that arises in the 
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market. This is a value that makes the price result higher than the marginal cost –note that ti
tg
π∂
∂  is 
negative–. ti
tg
π∂
∂  can be interpreted as the ability of the firm to modify the prices, while 
i
tg  measures how 
much does the firm benefits from that increment. 
The strategic term shows the most critical issue that the oligopolistic competition introduces in the 
modeling of power markets. Actually, it results in a complex transformation of the ordered generation 
costs of the system. In other words, the term it ti gg
π∂
∂  not only raises the marginal cost of the firms, but 
also may change the merit order. A big firm, owning a generation portfolio with a high maximum output, 
will face a high market power term, because the production below the margin will be high. By contrast, 
smaller firms will face a smaller incentive to raise the price, since their infra-marginal production is low. 
Consider two plants: the first belongs to the big firm, and the second to the small firm. In addition, the 
first plant has lower generation costs than the second. The problem introduced by the strategic interaction 
is that it may cause the bid price of the second plant to be lower than the bid price of the first, because the 
incentive of the big firm to exercise market power is higher than the incentive of the small firm. In other 
words, the merit order is not known a priori, but it is determined through the solution of the game. 
Therefore, representing the market-clearing price as a certain calibration of the generation cost of the 
marginal plant, and consequently simplifying the game between producers considering no market power, 
may be not approximate enough. The strategic term implies that the bid price of the marginal plant 
depends not only on its own cost, but also on the production of the rest of the generation portfolio.  
Therefore, the oligopolistic competition plays a key role in the evolution of power prices, and 
consequently the equilibrium component of the price must reflect these effects. Thus, the model for the 
equilibrium factor should be an oligopolistic market model. We argue that any fundamental model that 
disregards the strategic interaction, including those built on an a priori merit order, will not be able to 
capture, in general, the characteristics of the evolution of power prices in a suitable manner.  
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4. THE EQUILIBRIUM PERTURBATION FACTOR 
The previous section describes the effects that a static fundamental model, based on a quantity game, can 
describe. It is necessary, in addition, to analyze what kind of effects it cannot capture. First, it is not easy 
to define the generation cost of the plants in advance. In fact, agents in power markets use to purchase in 
advance a large part of the supplies required for the production of electricity. For example, it is common 
practice to purchase natural gas supplies through long-term contracts –say 10 or 20 years in advance–, 
whose prices may have more to do with the particular negotiation of the contract than with international 
indexes, such as Henry Hub or ICE prices. From this point of view, it is difficult to estimate the real cost 
of producing electricity. However, since we assume no strategic behavior with respect to power 
purchases, the price of the contract is usually strongly related to liquidly traded indexes.  
Furthermore, it is in general computationally expensive to model the short-term operation of the system in 
detail. The representation of the technical characteristics of power systems operation usually results in 
complex optimization problems for the firms, computationally very expensive. As an instance of 
complicating short-term operation issues, including the start-up costs of the power plants transform the 
profit-maximization problem in a non-convex program. However, market players must internalize these 
costs in their bids, so that they will be included in the final price. The price to pay for including start-up 
costs, on the other hand, is the increased difficulty of the resulting model.   
Nevertheless, the most delicate issue concerns the fundamental model used to find the transformation of 
the underlying variables. The equilibrium framework studied above captures the effect of the strategic 
interaction between market players by means of a static equilibrium model. However, the quantity game 
is just an approximation of the real behavior of a firm. A more detailed description would take into 
account that the bidding process involves not only the quantity decision, but the determination of the bid 
price as well. This fact would lead us to the statement of more sophisticated games, which calculates the 
profit-maximization problem deciding a complete curve relating production decisions and bid prices, 
which results in the Supply Function Equilibrium, Klemperer and Meyer (1989). In addition, we model 
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the oligolistic competition by means of a static game. The real decision-making process involves a 
sequence of stages where the acquisition of information with respect to competitors’ decisions plays a key 
role. However, the static game disregards the effects of dynamic competition. Moreover, electricity 
markets are very often more subject to regulatory decisions than any other commodity market. From this 
point of view, the true game is not only a game between market players, but additionally it should contain 
the strategic interaction between market players and the regulator.  
Therefore, the equilibrium model cannot capture all the relevant features of power price dynamics. There 
is an uncertainty about the equilibrium price of the system that is difficult to anticipate through the 
behavior of market players. The perturbation component aims to capture the uncertainty around the 
equilibrium marginal price. Therefore, one should expect several features derived from this definition. 
First, the impact of these random shocks in the electricity price should tend to disappear. Consider the 
effect of an unexpected high price, in the sense that it is not explained as a consequence of a random 
shock in the fundamentals. It may be motivated by a punctual bidding strategy of one or several agents, or 
even by a mistake in the bidding process. The idea is that the source of uncertainty is not explained 
through the observation of the underlying drivers. It will probably result in higher prices the next periods, 
which can be interpreted as a reaction of market players to punish the rivals’ strategy, or a reaction 
motivated by the uncertainty in the nature of the movement. However, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the price will tend to the long-term equilibrium of the system as the unexpected high price is forgotten. 
Therefore, the short-term component should revert to the long-term equilibrium. Thus, the perturbation 
component will be modeled as stochastic process that will exhibit equilibrium reversion, that is, it will 
revert to the equilibrium factor. 
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5. THE MODEL 
The next step consists of the proposal of a specific model, based on the analysis carried out in previous 
sections. Therefore, we will first describe the model aimed to capture the equilibrium component, and 
then we will state the model for the equilibrium perturbation factor.  
5.1. The equilibrium model 
The oligopolistic model that introduced Barquín, Centeno and Reneses (2004) is of particular interest for 
the purpose of our methodology. One of the fundamental insights pointed out by this methodology is that 
the first order equilibrium conditions are equivalent to a quadratic program, which is easier to solve. We 
will show next how the equilibrium can be found through an equivalent quadratic problem.  
We begin with the quantity game defined in section 3. The solution of the game is characterized by the 
first order optimality conditions of the profit-maximization programs provided by equations (3.2)-(3.4), 
and the market clearing condition defined in equation (3.5). As shown in Barquín, Centeno and Reneses 
(2004), these equilibrium conditions are the same as the first order optimality conditions of the following 
quadratic program: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2
,
1min
2
. .
0
i it
t t ti
i t t
ii i
t t
i i
t t
i
t t t
i
g c g
g
s t g g
R g
g D
π
µ
λ
π
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪+⎨ ⎬∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
≤
=
=
∑
∑
 (5.1) 
where ( ) 0itR g =  represents the set of system constraints considered. Since the program (5.1) is based on 
a quadratic optimization, it can take advantage of a well-developed theoretical corpus as well as very 
powerful algorithms and software. Therefore, this model can deal with real-size systems with little 
computational effort. In fact, we think that the computational efficiency of the model is an important 
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advantage with respect to complementarity-based approaches, such as Day, Hobbs and Pang (2002). A 
comparison between different approaches can be found Neuhoff, Barquín, Boots, Ehrenmann, Hobbs, 
Rijkers and Vázquez (2005). 
Besides, the program (5.1) allows for a rather general representation of the demand behavior. In fact, it is 
worth to note that we have assumed no price elasticity in the behavior of the system demand. However, it 
is not difficult to represent demand reactions in the proposed model, by means of the use of the utility of 
the demand. The quadratic program will be –see Barquín, Centeno and Reneses (2004) for details-: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
,
,
1min
2
. .
0
i it
t t t ti
i t tt
ii j i
t t
i i
t t
g c g U D
g
s t g g
R g
π
µ
λ
⎧ ⎫∂⎪ ⎪+ +⎨ ⎬∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
≤
=
∑ ∑
 (5.2) 
where ( ) ( ) 20,
0
1 1
2
D
t t t t t t t
t
U D D dD D D Dπ α
⎛ ⎞= = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  is the utility of the demand. However, it is usual to 
consider that competitors’ reaction comes before the demand’s, so that the demand elasticity is 
disregarded. On the other hand, the parameter ti
tg
π∂
∂ , representing the price responses of market players, 
must be calibrated in order to solve the equilibrium. This problem will be analyzed in section 7. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the price responses must be non-negative, so that the quadratic 
problem is well defined. In addition, removing the quadratic term in the objective function allows us to 
recover the classical unit-commitment problem. In other words, the quadratic term describes the 
adjustment of the bid prices from the generating costs. 
Finally, note that in general the problem can be stated using the output of each power plants. That is: 
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( ) ( )
( )
2 ,
,
, ,
,
,, ,
, ,
,
,
1min
2
. .
0
i i jt
t t ti j
i j t t
i i j i
t t t
j
i ji j i j
t t
i j i j
t t
i j
t t t
i j
g c g
g
s t g g
g g
R g
g D
π
κ
µ
λ
π
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=
≤
=
≤
∑
∑
∑
 (5.3) 
where ,i jtg  is the production of the plant j  belonging to the producer i  at time t . 
5.2. The equilibrium perturbation factor 
The model for the short-term component ty  will be a discrete-time autoregressive process. This model 
allows for capturing the equilibrium-reverting behavior of power prices. The model is given by the 
following expression: 
 1
1
t
t t i i
i
y h u− +
=
= ∑  (5.4) 
where ( )0,i tu N σ∼  are random shocks, and 1t ih − +  are the series of parameters. This quite general 
model can represent many of the models proposed to describe energy prices. In particular, we propose to 
fit an autoregressive model of the form: 
 ( )1 t tH q y u− =  (5.5) 
where 1q−  is the lag operator and ( )1H q−  is an autoregressive polynomial, or possibly the product of 
several polynomials. The rationale for several polynomials is the fact that the equilibrium perturbation 
component ty  should capture any seasonal behavior left by the long-term component. For instance, 
power prices typically present a weekly periodical component that is mainly related to different demands 
on working days and weekends, and it is not part of the long-term component. Therefore, this behavior is 
described in the model through the product of two autoregressive polynomials. That is,  
 16 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 7d wH q H q H q− − −=  (5.6) 
where the base lag of ( )1dH q−  is a day, and the base lag of ( )7wH q−  is a week. This model is fit using 
the Akaike criterion –see for instance Lütkepohl (1993)–. Then, we obtain the truncated polynomial 
( )1 1H q− −  to get the coefficients { }1 1,...,t i i th − + =  of  (5.4). 
Turning to the model for the random shocks iu , it should be taken into account that power prices usually 
are characterized by stochastic volatility. That is, the volatility of the price is higher during some periods, 
but then they revert to lower volatility levels –volatility clustering–. We will model the innovations iu  to 
have GARCH dynamics –Bollerslev (1986)–, in order to take into account the stochastic volatility: 
 2 2 2
1 1
QP
i j i j k i k
j k
σ α σ β ε− −
= =
= +∑ ∑  (5.7) 
 ( )0,1i Nε ∼  (5.8) 
The approach proposed in this paper allows for handling the power price volatility related to the volatility 
in its fundamentals in a convenient manner. Assume that the only risk factor affecting power prices is the 
natural gas price. Then it is possible to calculate the power prices for a sample of gas price scenarios, and 
so to obtain the volatility caused by gas price dynamics, capturing the effect of oligopolistic behavior.  
6. ANALYZING ELECTRICITY PRICES 
One of the most discussed properties of power prices is the presence of spikes. Our model provides a 
fundamental explanation for these large random movements. That is, the scarcity conditions of the system 
in a certain period is well defined by the demand model and the production structure. Let us consider a 
certain period when demand is so high that most of the plants are required to produce. The opportunity 
costs of the peaking plants would produce non-served energy prices..  
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The above reasoning is the usual scarcity pricing of power systems. There is, however, another effect 
related to oligopolistic markets. During scarcity periods, most of the plants have to produce, and thus the 
effective competitors are reduced to a small number of plants. In a model disregarding market power, this 
case may be represented by a scaling factor representing an increased generation cost for such periods. 
But consider two different peaking plants, one belonging to a firm that owns just this unit, and the other 
belonging to a firm with a large amount of production. The incentive to raise the price above their 
generation costs is not the same for these firms. Assume that only one of the two will be cleared. If the 
small firm bids the maximum price, and the large firm just a little bit lower price, the plant owned by the 
large firm will be cleared. Otherwise, the plant cleared will be the smallest firm’s one. Nevertheless, the 
small firm needs more run-time hours. Therefore, the firm owning the marginal plant crucially determines 
the magnitude of the spike. This fact is, from our point of view, a central advantage of our modeling 
approach.  
Another effect that is difficult to explain without considering the market-power term is the impact of 
variability in demand levels and fuel prices. Considering just a scaling factor in the generation costs is 
equivalent to assume that, price sensitivities to changes in fundamental drivers’ values are independent of 
the actual production. In other words, if the gas price is doubled the electricity price will be doubled as 
well, when the marginal plant is a gas-fired unit. Additionally, consider an increase in the generation cost 
of the marginal plant, possibly caused by an increased fuel price. According to (3.2), the increase of the 
market price is proportional to the increase in the generation cost. However, the impact of the change in 
the fuel price is measured by a change in the equilibrium of the game, which is in general different of 
such a proportional change. In fact, the merit order may change so that there is no effect at all. 
Regarding asymmetries of power prices, we have shown how the opportunities to exercise market power 
make the power price distribution to be structurally different of the marginal cost of the system. The term 
it
ti
t
g
g
π∂
∂  in (3.2) is an increasing function of the total generation of each firm, so it may be approximated 
as an increasing function of the system demand. Furthermore, the model also implies a connection with 
 18 
theoretical results regarding the risk premium of electricity prices. In particular, it implies a relationship 
between risk premia and market power. As shown in Bessembinder and Lemon (2002), power price 
skewness produce a risk premium in forward contracts:  informally, the higher probability of positive 
deviations motivates that market players ask for compensation when trading electricity in advance. When 
market power is considered, the forward price is increased to account for the expected opportunities to 
exercise market power. Now, the additional term does not describe a symmetric factor. The total 
generation of the firm that is setting the price defines the increased cost, so the probability of generation 
determines the shape of the price distribution at a certain instant. Another effects, such as the power 
network, may be taken into account as well.  
7. THE CALIBRATION METHODOLOGY 
Let us begin by describing the methodology to estimate the equilibrium factor from a set of prices.  
7.1. Equilibrium factor calibration 
In addition, let us denote the equilibrium model defined by a certain scenario e  of fuel prices and system 
demand as 
 ( )
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 (6.1) 
where the superscript e  denotes the variables in the scenario considered. We have substituted the term 
t
i
tg
π∂
∂  by ,i tθ . The rationale behind this change is that, in order to solve the model, we use the conjectured 
price response approach. That is, we assume that the price sensitivity is part of the problem data, and will 
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be denoted by ,i tθ . Thus, we can express the equilibrium factor of the market price as 
( ){ }arg maxe it tVπ θ= . The equilibrium model is then defined by the strategic parameters itθ . From the 
statistical point of view, there are two many parameters to determine embedded in the equilibrium factor. 
Actually, since itθ  represents one parameter for each market player and each point in time, the 
equilibrium factor can match any set of price values –the overfitting problem–. Hence, the approach 
adopted in this paper is to rely again on fundamental considerations: the strategic behavior of market 
players should not change each point in time. Consider, for instance, a set  { }1,..., st t  representing the 
period when the strategic behavior does not change. We impose an additional constraint so that 
1
...
s
i i
t tθ θ= = , which can be understood as a version of the parsimonious principle, or alternatively as an 
assumption concerning the behavior of market players.  
The approach adopted in this paper to represent the above constraint is to state an aggregated version of 
the equilibrium model. The subscript t  in the problem (6.1) is substituted by τ , so that we have an 
aggregate production iGτ  of the firm i  in the set τ , and the aggregate price in τ , τπ . In addition, let us 
denote by m  the set firms owning a marginal plant at τ . From the optimality conditions of the problem, 
we have that, for the marginal firm(s) m , it must be fulfilled the following equation:  
 
( )
0
m
m m
m
c G
G
G
τ
τ τ τ
τ
π θ ∂− − =∂  (6.2) 
From (6.2) we can obtain the strategic parameter of the marginal firm(s) as a function of model price: 
 
( )1 mm
m m
c G
G G
τ
τ τ
τ τ
θ π
⎛ ⎞∂⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟∂⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (6.3) 
Therefore, we state an iterative procedure that works as follows: 
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• First, we assume that every agent bids competitively, or in other words, no 
market power opportunities are taken into account, ,0 0iτθ = . With this 
assumption, we obtain a collection of productions ,0mGτ  and an equilibrium price 
0τπ . The second superscript denotes the iteration 0 
• The new strategic parameters ,m kτθ  are obtained using (6.3), but substituting τπ  
by the mean price observed in the market in the set τ , realτπ . The superscript k  
denotes the iteration number. Note that the new parameters correspond only to the 
marginal firms. The rest of parameters remain zero.  
• The new parameters ,m kτθ  changes the output decisions of the power producers, 
so that we obtain a new set of productions , 1m kGτ +  and a new price kτπ   
• The algorithm stops when the difference between equilibrium prices of two 
consecutive iterations is less than a tolerance ε , 1k kτ τπ π ε+ − ≤  
7.2. Calibration of the model 
We will study in this section three alternative approaches to calibrate the complete model. The first 
approach that will be analyzed is based on recovering the risk-neutral measure from market prices. The 
second approach relies on the statistical estimation of the model parameters. Finally, we propose a mixed 
approach.  
The market approach 
Essentially, there are two general strategies to calibrate the model. The first strategy, which might be 
referred to as the market approach. The idea behind this methodology is that the model should be able to 
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recover the price of the instruments available in the market, since they contain the information used by 
the market agents to price the contracts. Therefore, one can use the direct approach of finding the model 
parameters that provide the prices of liquidly traded products. The method can be described as follows. 
It begins by the simulation of a set of price scenarios, { }1,...,e E∈ . Let us assume that the market price 
obtained from the model, for the scenario e , is given by e e et t tp yπ= + . The market approach to adjust the 
model consists of finding the parameters that match actual prices of liquidly traded instruments. Then, 
there is a set of prices, which will be denoted by ? kP , { }1,...,k N= , assuming that we observe N  
products. On the other hand, with the simulation of the model we can obtain values for the instruments 
based on the prices given by the model. Let us denote them as kP . Therefore, we can state the following 
least squares problem: 
 ?( )2
, , 1
min
i
M
N
kk
k
P P
θ ξ σ =
−∑  (6.4) 
The key condition for the procedure stated above is that the process for power prices can calculate the 
value of the contracts. For example, a the value of a forward contract provided by our model is defined by 
1
1 E e
F
e
P p
E =
= ∑ , and consequently allows for the computation of the model parameters that match market 
prices.  
The statistical approach 
There are, however, several limitations of the previous approach, which ultimately motivate the use of an 
alternative calibration strategy. First, the problem (6.4) is usually ill-conditioned. In addition, many 
power markets do not have a large enough number of liquidly traded instruments. Finally, the actively 
traded products may not contain all the relevant information for pricing any other contract. For example, 
monthly options account only for monthly volatility. If the contract studied is a daily option, the volatility 
involved in the calculation is the daily volatility. Using only monthly contracts for the calibration of the 
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price model will not capture the appropriate dynamics of daily volatility of market prices. Therefore, the 
calibration of the model just based on actual market data is not possible in most of the power markets –
the Spanish market, described in the case study of section 8, is a typical example of such a market–.The 
statistical approach for the calibration problem is the estimation by means of a set of historical spot 
prices. This alternative is based on a direct statistical estimation of the parameters, likely by the 
maximization of the likelihood, as in the reduced-form models. The procedure would work as follows. 
We can express the equilibrium factor of the market price as ( ){ }arg maxe it tVπ θ= . Using a set of 
historical prices, we can define the strategic parameters required, by means of the algorithm described in 
section 7.1. In addition, the estimated strategic parameters allow us to compute a set of historical values 
for the equilibrium factor, and consequently to calculate the differences between historical prices and 
historical equilibrium-factor values – Note that the model obtains the mean of the real price during a 
certain period, the set τ . But it does not match the price at each instant t –. Actually, these errors are 
supposed to be represented by the equilibrium perturbations, which we model by the expression 
 1
1
t
e e
t t i i
i
y h u− +
=
= ∑  (6.5) 
Therefore, we can use the previously computed historical errors to estimate the time series model (6.5). 
Therefore, the strategy to estimate the model would be: 
• Find the strategic parameters required for the definition of the equilibrium factor 
using the methodology described in section 7.1.  
• Calculate the errors between real prices and equilibrium prices. Note that the 
model obtains the mean of the real price during a certain period –the set τ –. But 
it does not match the price at each instant t  
• Estimate the model ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. to 
describe historical errors 
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A hybrid approach 
Furthermore, we propose a hybrid approach for the calibration process. It is based on estimating as many 
parameters as possible using actual market data. Assume, for example, that we study where weekly 
forward contracts are liquidly traded. A possible strategy is to use the contracts to determine the strategic 
parameters of the equilibrium factor, and to estimate a time series model to describe historical errors. This 
is the methodology used in the case study of section 8.   
8. CASE STUDY  
One of the most important features of the Spanish wholesale market is that, at present, it is quite illiquid. 
Since July 2007, there is an organized exchange (OMIP1), although there is still little trading done in the 
exchange. Most of the trading activity is done over-the-counter. Additionally, the regulator has imposed 
the obligation, since 2007, for the two major power producers of the market –currently Endesa and 
Iberdrola– to negotiate a percentage of their production capacity (Virtual Power Plants). They have the 
obligation to sell European call options, which give the right to the owner to buy a certain amount of 
electricity for each hour of a period of three months. The regulator fixes the strike price, and a public 
auction settles the price. In addition, a small amount of the demand (10% approximately) is allocated 
through quarterly products: approximately ten days before the beginning of each quarter –e. g. the first 
quarter, from January to March– there is a public auction (CESUR auction2) where the demand is sold 
through quarterly products with delivery each hour of the quarter. Summing up, the main product traded 
in the Spanish market is the forward contract, essentially through over-the-counter agreements.  
In this context, we study the daily price corresponding to the first eight months of 2008. 
                                                     
1 http://www.omip.pt/. 
2 http://www.subasta-cesur.eu. 
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8.1. The model 
The first step in the simulation process is the definition of the power price model. The general scheme of 
the model is presented in Figure 1.     
Price scenarios
Gas prices
Brent prices
Coal prices
Forward curve 
models
Demand
Seasonal + AR
Perturbations
AR-GARCH
Equilibrium factor
Strategic model
Calibration of the 
power price model
 
Figure 1. The model scheme 
In this section, we outline the description of the evolution of the primary drivers, represented in the left 
part of Figure 1, which are the basic input for the model. In addition, we provide a description of the 
methodology to obtain a set of price scenarios generated from the model proposed in this paper.  
Fuel price model 
The approach considered in this study is to split fuels in two categories. The feature that distinguishes 
between the two groups is whether the fuel is liquidly traded or not. Thus, we consider separate models 
for the evolution of coal, heating-oil and gas prices. The rest of costs, namely the corresponding to 
nuclear plants, are modeled as a known variable cost. The model for the evolution of coal, oil and gas 
prices is the model of forward curves proposed in Clewlow and Strickland (1999). Basically, it can be 
represented by the following expression: 
 ,
, 1
( )
N
t T i i
t
t T i
dF
T t dW
F
φ
=
= −∑  (6.6) 
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where the changes in the forward curve are explained by means of N  random shocks, T  is the maturity 
of the contract and t  is the quotation date. Each of these perturbations is specified as a Gaussian factor 
i
tdW  multiplied by a deterministic function of the time-to-maturity ( )i T tφ − , which is defined through 
principal components analysis. 
Demand model  
Models for power demand have attracted a considerable amount of research activity –see for instance 
Weron (2006)–. In addition, utilities and system operators have been developing these models for many 
years to improve short-term forecasts of power loads. Typically, they are complex non-linear 
transformations of weather variables, and macroeconomic and demographic data. This detailed 
representation follows from the need for accurate forecasts of power demand in the short term. However, 
when the objective of the model is to provide a description of the longer-term distributions – as in the 
pricing model proposed in this paper–, there is little advantage in capturing each factor affecting the 
power demand, when there is not enough information to describe accurately the evolution of such factors. 
Therefore, it is in many cases preferable to choose a simplified representation to represent the distribution 
of power demand. We choose to model in this case study the Spanish power demand directly, instead of 
as a function of the temperature or humidity. The main reason is that there is no trading activity 
concerning the primary drivers, and then there is no market information available. Thus, the model for 
power demand is based on an autoregressive process, combined with a deterministic seasonal component: 
 1 1 ...t t t n t n tD M D Dα α ε− −= + + + +   (6.7) 
The model parameters { }1,... nα α  are defined by maximizing the maximum likelihood using historical 
data, and the number of parameters n is chosen following the Akaike criterion, see for instance Lütkepohl 
(1993). The Linear Hinges model, following the methodology in [Vázquez, 2008 # 429], estimates the 
seasonal component tM .  
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In addition, hydro and wind production are modeled in the study as known production in the system. 
Although in a general study they should be stochastic input as well, we choose to model them as 
deterministic to highlight the effects of fuel prices in power markets. Therefore, the demand values faced 
by equilibrium model should be thought of as the thermal demand of the system. That is, the system 
demand discounting the hydro production and the wind generation.  
Equilibrium model     
The input data required to solve the equilibrium model stated in section 5.1 are the system demand, and 
the variable costs of the power plants. Therefore, there is a need to transform the fuel prices provided by 
equation (6.6) into variable costs. We model such transformation, in the study, as the price of just one 
forward contract of the curve, multiplied by the efficiency of the plant. In particular, the variable cost will 
be the forward price of the contract expiring in three months, multiplied by the efficiency. The rationale 
behind is that power producers need at least three months to get additional fuel, and their variable cost is 
the cost of refueling. In addition, we describe the procedure to calibrate the strategic parameter in section 
8.2. 
Equilibrium deviations model 
The last step is the definition of the short-term component. We will assume that the equilibrium 
component is calibrated. In this study, we use historical deviations from the long-term equilibrium to fit 
the short-term model. In other words, with the historical values of fuel prices and demands, we obtain the 
historical price provided by the long-term model, and then we calculate historical errors as differences 
between the model and the real price. That is, we obtain the set of errors { }1,... Ny y  provided by 
i i iy p π= − , where i  represents each of the historical dates, ip  is the real price at date i  and iπ  is the 
equilibrium price at date i . The set of dates used in this study corresponds to year 2007.  
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8.2. Calibration of the equilibrium model 
The procedure to calibrate the model in this study is ultimately defined by market data available in the 
Spanish market. The only forward-looking contract traded in the market is the monthly forward. Thus, to 
use only the market approach to calibrate the model one should assume a unique, monthly strategic 
parameter. On the contrary, we use an hybrid approach. First, we use historical prices to find out the 
pattern of the strategic parameter. That is, we fit the strategic parameter to describe historical prices. To 
do so, we assume the same parameter for every peak hour in a certain month, and the same parameter for 
the off-peak hours in a month –the off-peak period is defined as the first twelve hours in a day–. This 
provides the variation pattern of a monthly strategic parameter, from peak to off-peak periods. Then, we 
use the forward contracts with expiration in 2008 to estimate a monthly parameter. Finally, peak and off-
peak parameters are defined by applying the historical pattern to the monthly parameters.  
8.3. Justification of the model 
In order to justify the model, we need to show that it can recover appropriately the empirical 
characteristics of the electricity prices. To do so, we study of the behavior of the fundamental 
transformation proposed in this paper. That is, we will test the power price distribution assuming that the 
evolution of primary drivers is perfectly known, so instead of simulating fuel prices and demand values, 
we will take actual realizations of the variables. Thus, with actual values for the input variables, we 
calibrate the model and analyze the price distributions obtained. Figure 2 shows the power price in the 
test time scope, compared with the real prices.    
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Figure 2.- Model vs. real prices 
In addition, Figure 2 shows the price obtained assuming that there are no opportunities to exercise market 
power. In such a case, the power price is the variable cost of the marginal plant, i. e. the most expensive 
plant that is producing. In addition, Figure 3 shows the resulting strategic parameters for the firms in the 
system at each month of the simulation scope –firm number one is the largest one, and firm number 6 is 
the 6th largest firm–. 
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Figure 3.- Calibrated strategic parameters for each of the firms in the system. 
Regarding price volatility, Figure 4 compares the annualized volatility of the prices obtained with the 
model and the actual volatility. It is important to note that the parametric decomposition of this paper, 
describing the price as made up of long- and short-term factors describes the volatility of real prices 
accurately. Actually, the price volatility is the sum of a long-term level, defined by the volatility induced 
by the volatility of the primary drivers, and a short-term level that reverts to the long-term volatility.  
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Figure 4.- Model volatility 
Turning to higher order moments, Table 1 compares the model and empirical values of the third and 
fourth normalized moments for different periods. Q1 represents the first quarter of 2008, Q1+Q2 the first 
and second quarters, and Sept. is the time scope of the simulation, from January to August of 2008. The 
numbers in the table shows the agreement of the higher normalized moments. This is particularly 
important because we did not use historical values to match price distributions, but we used the 
fundamental representation of the model to capture the market characteristics. Matching higher order 
moments, then, is an additional justification of our modeling approach.  
 Skewness Kurtosis 
 Empirical Strategic Empirical Strategic 
Q1 (2008) 0.1675 0.1793 -0.3663 -0.4976 
Q1+Q2 (2008) 0.8834 0.8926 2.3922 2.3426 
Sept. (2008) 0.2768 0.2531 -0.8308 -1.0032 
Table 1.- Model and empirical third and fourth moments of the price distribution. 
In addition, there are important features of power prices that should be represented by the model. First, 
the volatility of power prices depends on the system demand. That is, when the system demand is high, 
the volatility of prices is higher than when system demand is lower. Figure 5 shows the dependence of the 
volatility weekly log-prices on the system demand. This is a typical phenomenon of electricity prices. 
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High levels of demand imply a great variability in the number of plants actually producing. When a 
peaking plant starts to produce, the inframarginal production of the owner is typically high, and thus the 
market power incentive. Therefore, each peaking plant that starts to produce forces a steep variation in the 
price.     
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Figure 5.- Volatility of weekly log-prices increases with the demand level. 
 
Another important effect, strongly related to the previous dependence of volatility on demand levels, is 
the dependence of the volatility on the implied heat rate of the system –the implied heat rate is the ratio 
between power and natural gas prices–. As shown in Figure 6, volatility is low for small values of the 
implied heat rate, and it increases as the implied heat rate increases. This effect can be explained with the 
dependence on the system demand. High levels of demand, in the Spanish system, correspond to high 
values of the implied heat rate. When the implied heat rate is low, the volatility is low, because in the 
Spanish system this corresponds to a case where the marginal plant is always a coal unit, and there is little 
incentive to exercise market power. In a system with more nuclear production, so that sometimes the 
marginal plant is a nuclear unit, and sometimes is coal-fired, we would expect that the volatility of the left 
side of the curve would be higher.  
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Figure 6.- Volatility of weekly log-prices increases with the implied heat rate. 
The correlation structure of power prices is another important feature that must be captured by the price 
model. The power plant is essentially a spread option between power and fuel prices, and consequently 
the correlation is central for hedging and pricing purposes. Again, the correlation structure has not been 
calibrated, so the agreement between empirical and model results can be considered as a powerful out-of-
sample test. Figure 7 shows that the correlation structure between gas and power prices obtained from 
empirical data and the one obtained from the model simulation follows the same pattern. When the 
implied heat rate is high, the correlation coefficients are low. This effect is related to the fact that for high 
heat rates, the marginal plant is probably a peaking unit, and for such demand values, the number of units 
producing has a stronger effect on power prices than the cost of the fuel used to produce –see comments 
on Figure 5–. The mid part of the curve shows high correlation coefficients for intermediate values of the 
heat rate. In this part of the curve, the plant setting the price is probably a gas- fired unit, and 
consequently the correlation between gas and power prices increases. The left part of the curve shows 
that, for low values of the heat rate the correlation decreases, representing the fact that low gas/power 
rates implies that a lower-cost plat, typically coal fired, is setting the price.      
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Figure 7.- Gas correlation vs. implied heat rate 
Figure 8 shows the correlation between power prices, and gas and coal prices, in the lower panel, and the 
system demand in the upper panel. Both panels consider a time scope from April 1st to May 20th, to 
show in detail the dependence of the correlation pattern on the demand pattern. It can be observed that 
when the system demand is low, the correlation with gas prices is lower, and the correlation with coal 
prices is higher. Moreover, we can explain this correlation structure from a fundamental viewpoint. When 
the system demand is low, the marginal plant will be probably a coal-fired unit, and on the contrary, when 
the system demand is high, the marginal plant will be a gas-fired unit.    
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Figure 8.- Evolution of system demand and fuel correlations. 
9. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed in this paper a new family of models to describe the evolution of electricity prices. It 
combines a fundamental model to describe the price formation process with an explicit model of random 
deviations around the fundamental description. The fundamental model builds on oligopoly analysis, and 
we have shown that the strategic behavior of spot market players plays a central role in the definition of 
the price distribution, both under the real probability and under the risk-neutral measure. When the ability 
of power producers to raise the spot price withholding production is taken into account, generators’ 
output decisions define the incentive to increase the spot price, and this incentive induces asymmetries in 
the power price distribution. Consequently, opportunities to exercise market power are the source of an 
additional risk premium that compensates for the possibility of obtaining an increased price in the spot 
market.  
Furthermore, we have proposed a particular model to describe the spot price evolution, and we have 
proved it in the context of the Spanish wholesale market. The case study shows that the model proposed 
in this paper successfully captures both the features of the risk-neutral probability and the correlation 
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structure of the spot price. The volatility and correlation structure, as we have shown, strongly depends 
on the characteristics of the generation mix of each particular system. Therefore, projecting this structure 
into the future using only price data is a difficult task.    
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